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EXECUTIVE BRIEFING
T he years of armed conflict inJammu and Kashmir have
claimed the lives of tens of thousands of
people, and also wounded and displaced
several thousands more. The pain of this
violence was seen on the national stage
through specific incidents such as the
kidnapping of Rubia Syed, the daughter
of then Union Home Minister in 1989,
followed by the killing of H. L. Khera,
general manager of Hindustan Machine
Tools and Musheer-ul-Haq, vice-
chancellor of University of Kashmir in
1990. The armed rebels did not even spare
the religious places. The economic costs
too have been devastating. Underlying this
continuous upheaval is a number of issues.
ISSUES
1. Accession to India
The most contentious issue and one
that has been a subject of international
attention is the accession of Jammu and
Kashmir to India after Partition in 1947.
Pakistan has continued to maintain that
it should have become its territory since
it had a Muslim majority and also alleged
that the then ruler was pressurised to
accede to India. It also accused India of
violating the commitment to hold a
plebiscite on its future. On the other side,
India insisted that the accession was
completely valid and accused Pakistan of
forcefully occupying parts of the state.
India also maintained that since Jammu
and Kashmir is an integral and inalienable
part of the country there can be no
question of negotiating on the question of
its accession.
The dispute continues to be the key
stumbling block in the relations between
the two neighbours. For Pakistan it is
the core issue in its relationship with
India. New Delhi maintains that the
matter has already been settled, and
the more important issue is that of
Pakistan of promoting insurgency and
terrorism in India, especially in Jammu
and Kashmir.
The Author is an Assistant Professor in the Conflict Resolution Programme at National Institute of Advanced Studies,
Bangalore.
The paper has benefited from the comments by Dr. Arpita Anant and Dr. Yoginder Singh Sikand. It also had the benefit of
discussions with seminar audiences in New Delhi on 21-22 March 2011, and a discussion in Bangalore on 26 August 2010.
None of them are, of course, responsible for the views presented here.
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2. Human rights issues
Since the beginning of the armed
conflict violent incidents have become an
everyday occurrence in the state. To tackle
the situation special laws like the Armed
Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special
Powers Act, 1990 and the Public Safety
Act, 1978 have been promulgated. But
these Acts have been associated with
allegations of human rights abuses. There
have been regular protests demanding the
removal of these laws and the withdrawal
of the government’s armed forces. There
is however no consensus among the
political parties whether to repeal or
amend these special laws. And, some
others also argue that the withdrawal of
special laws would demoralize the armed
forces.
3. Azadi, autonomy or self-rule
Azadi has different meanings for
different people. At one extreme it is a
demand for complete independence while
for others it is a demand for greater
autonomy. The mainstream political
parties, like the National Conference and
the Peoples Democratic Party advocate
autonomy and self-rule. The National
Conference demands the strengthening of
the Article 370 of the Constitution of India.
The party fears the abrogation of the
Article would encourage separatism, while
those favoring its abrogation argue that
it is creating psychological barriers
thereby encouraging separatist tendencies.
The Peoples Democratic Party advocates
a step-by-step integration of Indian and
Pakistani Kashmirs in fields like trade,
travel, institutions and legislature. It
believes the resolution of the dispute
requires a combination of intrastate,
interstate and suprastate measures. It
insists that self-rule is a “formulation that
will integrate the region without
disturbing the extant sovereign authority
over delimited territorial space”.
4. Division within
One of the visible impacts of the
current conflict has been the gradual
polarisation of state’s population along
regional lines. The people in Jammu as
well as Ladakh often complain that both
the Central and state governments are
neglecting their regions and give undue
importance to the Kashmir valley.
The divide snowballed into a major
controversy in 2008 when the state
government decided to transfer 100 acres
of forest land to the Shri Amaranth Shrine
Board. The Board later gave up the claim
on the forest land after the government
gave an assurance to provide all necessary
facilities to pilgrims going to the shrine.
Following this impasse, several Jammu-
based organisations intensified the
demand for the reorganisation of the state.
CONFLICT IN JAMMU AND KASHMIR
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The people of Ladakh too have demanded
union territory status.
5. Migration of Kashmiri Pandits
Insecurity due to armed conflict in the
1990s compelled around 55,000 Kashmiri
Pandit families to flee their homes and
take shelter in Jammu, Delhi and
elsewhere in the country. Despite being
numerically small, the community was a
“highly visible” group that was
traditionally land owning, educated and
elitist. They were able to convey their
distress at being forced to live for two
decades in temporary shelters with
minimal basic facilities. Politicians and
other leaders have spoken of their return,
but none could guarantee their safety. It
must be noted, however, that there were
Pandit families who did not migrate in the
1990s, and some of the migrants later
returned to the valley.
CONFLICT AND INSTITUTIONS
The present crisis can be seen as a
result of the inability to enforce a set of
abstract rules leading to the emergence of
new institutional practices. These could
include the government and its various
agencies, non-state armed groups and
other socio-political organisations. All
have come to be associated in different
capacities in the course of the conflict.
The initial reaction to the conflict has been
to treat it as a case of non-implementation
of rules, that is, as a law and order
problem. This helped the rebels tap the
discontent that emerged from the alleged
human rights violations by the
government forces. The dissatisfaction
on the ground was compounded by the
inability of the successive governments to
meet the growing aspirations of its people.
In practice this widespread discontent and
responses to it, have created non-state
institutions of the armed and unarmed
groups. South Asia Terrorism Portal listed
as many as 35 active and not-so-active
armed groups involved in the current




Armed groups created para-statal
organisations in the areas they operated
in that lay down a set of rules and have
the means and resources to enforce them.
Thus, they not only monitored the
government but also administered their
own social welfare services to gain public
support from their distribution of public
goods. In this way, many of the functions
which are within the domain of the state
institutions have been encroached upon by
the non-state institutions. They also
boycott all Indian national events like
Independence Day and Republic Day
celebrations. The overall impact has been
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the dilution of the legitimacy of state
institutions. Further, one of the striking
aspects of this long-running conflict has
been the proliferation of a large number
of socio-political organisations such as the
All Party Hurriyat Conference which have
been playing different roles in the course
of the conflict.
OPTIONS
We have not discovered any formulas
for setting things right. Apart from the
usual call for dialogue with all the
disgruntled groups, the effort of the
government has so far made very little
success on the ground. The tendency to
view the conflict as a law and order
problem has contributed to the
willingness to use force. Central
assistance has increased considerably
over the years to promoting faster
economic development of the state. One
of the major development initiatives
undertaken was the Prime Minister’s
Reconstruction Plan initiated in 2004
that involved an outlay of approximately
Rs. 28000 crores for various development
projects. Further, there has been a special
focus on “people to people” contact across
two parts of the state through Cross LoC
Travel and Cross LoC Trade. Very recently,
the Central government initiated a
comprehensive peace plan that included,
among others, the appointment of
interlocutors who are entrusted with the
task of undertaking a sustained dialogue
with the people of the state to understand
their problems and chart a future course
of action. Above all, India and Pakistan
continue to engage in bilateral talks
leading to a series of Kashmir-specific
confidence building measures (CBMs).
Among the other options that have not
always received the attention they
deserve, are the grant of autonomy, repeal
of AFSPA/PSA, enhancement of the
National Human Rights Commission’s
(NHRC) role in the state, third-party
mediation, and reorganisation of the
state.
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Quit Kashmir movement
I n 1946, the Jammu andKashmir National Conference
(NC) spearheaded the “Quit Kashmir”
movement against the alleged autocratic
administration of the Dogra ruler and the
annulment of the Treaty of Amritsar.
Several NC leaders, including Sheikh
Mohammad Abdullah, were arrested.
Accession of Jammu and Kashmir to
India
The erstwhile princely state of Jammu
and Kashmir acceded to India on 26
October 1947 through an Instrument of
Accession executed by Hari Singh, the
then ruler. It was formally accepted by
Lord Mountbatten, the Governor General
of India, on 27 October 1947. Pakistan
alleged that Hari Singh had no right to
execute the accession when the Standstill
Agreement was in force with it, while India
maintained that it was legal.
Bifurcation of Jammu and Kashmir
A Ceasefire Line came into being in
1949 following the Karachi Agreement by
India, Pakistan and the United Nations
in accordance with the United Nations
resolution of 13 August 1948, and divided
Jammu and Kashmir between India and
Pakistan.
Delhi Agreement, 1952
The agreement provided for Jammu
and Kashmir’s autonomy within the Indian
Union. Its main features include the vesting
of the residuary powers of legislature in the
state itself; the state would have its own
flag in addition to the union flag; the Sadar-
i-Riyasat would be elected by the state
legislature and be a person acceptable to
and appointed by the President of India;
Articles 52 to 62 of the Constitution of
India relating to the President and Vice
President would be applicable to the state;
and the Supreme Court of India would have
only appellate jurisdiction.
Simla Agreement, 1972
Through this agreement, both India
and Pakistan agreed to settle their
FLASHPOINTS
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differences over Jammu and Kashmir
through peaceful bilateral negotiations.
Pending the final settlement of any of the
problems, neither side would unilaterally
alter the situation. Both sides also decided
to withdraw their respective forces to their
side of the international border; and
decided to respect the Line of Control




The state has witnessed active armed
conflict since the late 1980s. It was
preceded by a state assembly election in
1987 that was widely-believed to be
rigged, and an anti-India demonstration
that broke out in the Kashmir Valley in
1988. The first major rebel attack took
place with bomb explosions in the city of
Srinagar in July 1988.  The rebels stepped
up violent activities including the
kidnapping of Rubia Syed, the daughter
of the then Union Home Minister, in
December 1989. She was released in
exchange for the release of five rebel
leaders.
Kashmiri Pandits’ displacement
Insecurity caused by the early phase
of the armed conflict led to the exodus of
tens of thousands of Pandits from the
Kashmir Valley. Some 55,000 families
were said to have been affected, and living
in Jammu, Delhi and some other places.
Seize of Hazratbal shrine
In 1993, security forces surrounded
Hazratbal shrine in Srinagar following its
occupation by armed rebels. The siege ended
after 32 days and the rebels surrendered.
Seize of Charar-e-Sharief shrine
In 1995, security forces launched an
offensive to flush out armed rebels holed
up at Charar-e-Sharief. The Charar-e-
Sharief shrine and a portion of the town
were damaged in the subsequent gun-
battle. Several rebels were killed while
others escaped.
Kargil war
Soon after the signing the Lahore
Declaration by Indian Prime Minister,
A B Vajpayee and Pakistan Prime Minister
Nawaz Sharif in February 1999, Pakistani
soldiers were spotted in Kargil area of
Jammu and Kashmir in the month of May,
forcing India to launched military action
to flush out the intruders. The Indian
armed forces successfully evicted the
intruders. Both sides ceased military
operations in July.
Passing of autonomy resolution
In 2000, the state assembly passed a
resolution accepting the report of the State
CONFLICT IN JAMMU AND KASHMIR
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Autonomy Committee (set up by the state
government to examine the issue of greater
autonomy). The report recommended
greater autonomy including the
restoration of the pre-1953 constitutional
status of the state. The resolution was
summarily rejected by the Central
government.
Collapse of the ceasefire
On 24 July 2000, the Hizb-ul
Mujahideen, an active rebel group,
offered a three-month long cease-fire
to facilitate negotiations with the
Central government. The government
accepted the offer. During the first
round of talks, Hizb-ul Mujahideen
insisted the government must
acknowledge Kashmir as a trilateral
dispute necessitating tripartite talks
between India, Pakistan and people of
Jammu and Kashmir. On 8 August, it
withdrew from the cease-fire citing non-
inclusion of Pakistan.
Ceasefire during Ramadan
The Central government offered to
suspend combat operations by security
forces against rebels during the holy
month of Ramadan with effect from 27
November 2000, hours ahead of
commencement of the holy month. The
six-month ceasefire was revoked on 23
May 2001.
Attack on state Assembly
On 1 October 2001, unidentified gunmen
sneaked into the high-security Assembly
complex located in Srinagar and engaged
the security forces deployed there in a
gun-battle, killing several people. The Jaish-
e-Mohammad, a leading armed group,
claimed responsibility for the attack.
Amarnath land controversy
In 2008, trouble broke out in the Kashmir
valley opposing the state authorities’
decision to transfer 100 acres of forest land
to Shri Amaranth Shrine Board for setting
up temporary shelters for pilgrims. The
Congress party-led state government
plunged into a crisis after the People
Democratic Party (PDP) pulled out of the
coalition opposing the land transfer. When
the state government revoked the land
transfer order, violent protests broke out in
Jammu region. The issue soon snowballed
into a divide between Jammu region and
Kashmir valley. The Central government
intervened and called an all-political party
meeting. The Board later gave up the claim
on the forest land after the government gave
an assurance to provide all necessary
facilities to pilgrims going to the shrine.
Protests against alleged human rights
violations
Over 150 people were killed in 2010 when
violent demonstrations broke out for over
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ADVANCED STUDIES
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three months in Srinagar and its
surrounding areas. It was triggered by the
alleged excesses committed by the security
forces. Educational institutions were shut
down for over three months due to the
unrest. To defuse the situation, an
all-political party delegation led by the
Union Home Minister P. Chidambaram
visited the state in September that year
and met representatives of political
parties including separatist leaders.
Following this visit, the Central
government initiated a comprehensive
peace plan, known as the Eight-point
Peace Formula. This provides for the
appointment of interlocutors to initiate
dialogue and a review of the deployment
of security forces.
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TERRAIN
J ammu and Kashmir, situatedbetween 320 172  N and 360 582
N latitude, and 730 262  E and
800 302  E longitude, constitutes the
northernmost state of India. The altitude
varies from 1000 to 28250 feet above the
sea level. It shares borders with Pakistan
in the west, China in the north and east,
and the Indian states of Punjab and
Himachal Pradesh in the south.
It has a total area of 222,236 sq. km
(78,114 sq. km under the occupation of
Pakistan, 37,555 sq. km under China, and
another 5,180 sq. km handed over to
China by Pakistan).  The erstwhile princely
state was administratively divided into
Jammu, Kashmir, Ladakh and Gilgit. In
1949 it was bifurcated. The Indian part
consists of Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh.
The Muzaffarabad area and Northern
Areas are under de facto Pakistan
administration. In addition, China controls
the trans-Karakoram Shaksgam valley
and the adjacent region, which Pakistan
unilaterally ceded to it in 1963 as part of
a boundary settlement, and also Aksaichin
and a strip of  Western Ladakh, into which
it intruded and then militarily occupied
in 1962.1
The state consisted of seven broad
physiographic zones: plains, foothills,
lesser Himalayas, greater Himalayas,
Kashmir valley, upper Indus valley, and
Karakoram.2 The Jammu region
comprises the plains, hills and mountains
south and west of the Pir Panjal range.
The Kashmir valley is situated at an
average elevation of about 5,300 feet
above sea level. Ladakh constitutes the
easternmost part. The Jammu-Srinagar
national highway is the only road link
between Kashmir valley and rest of the
country. The railway network has started
making its presence felt in the state.
Except for Jammu and Kathua
districts on the plains and the plateau of
Ladakh, the state is a mountainous region.
The water resources are abundant. The
state is administratively divided into
Kashmir and Jammu divisions which are
1 Verghese B.G. (2007), A J&K Primer: from Myth to Reality, pp. 7-8.
2 Government of India (2003), State Development Report Jammu & Kashmir 2003, pp. 11-12.
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further subdivided into 22 districts. The
Ladakh region comes under Kashmir
division. Each division is headed by a
Divisional Commissioner, each district by
a Deputy Commissioner.
The climatic conditions vary from
tropical in Jammu plains to semi-arctic
cold in Ladakh with Kashmir and Jammu
mountainous tracts having a temperate
climate. The annual rainfall varies from
about 92.6 mm in Leh, 650.5 mm in
Srinagar and 1115.9 mm in Jammu. The
state is blessed with riverine geography
and is geologically constituted of rocks
varying from the oldest period of the
earth’s history to the youngest present day
river and lake deposits.
The state has recorded a population
of 1,25,48,926 persons as per the
provisional estimates of the 2011 census,
which is about one per cent of the
country’s population. The literacy rate
was 68.74 per cent in the 2011 census as
against the national average of 74 per cent.
Agriculture and allied activities are the
predominant sector of its economy,
and it has a low level of industrial
development.
The state is a multi-ethnic and multi-
lingual entity. Ethnic groups on the Indian
Jammu and Kashmir
CONFLICT IN JAMMU AND KASHMIR
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side are mainly Dogras, Punjabis,
Kashmiris, Gujars and Bakarwals,
Ladakhis and Baltis while those living on
the other side are Punjabi, Pathan, Balti,
Dardi, Shin, Yashkun, Mongol, Tadjik,
Turkic and other Central Asian
extractions.3
3 Verghese B.G. (2007), p. 8.
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T he erstwhile princely state ofJammu and Kashmir acceded
to India through an Instrument of
Accession executed by its ruler Hari Singh
in October 1947, which Pakistan claimed
was done under pressure from India.
Pakistan even alleged that Hari Singh had
no authority to do so when a Standstill
Agreement––a temporary arrangements
designed to maintain the status quo ante
in respect of certain administrative
matters of common concern, pending the
accession of the princely state to either
India or Pakistan––was in force with it.
India, however, insisted that the accession
was legal.
In 1947-48 a Pakistani aggression
(which several Pakistani commentators
referred to as an indigenous uprising
supported by tribesmen) resulted in that
country occupying several key areas
including Muzaffrabad. India petitioned the
United Nations Security Council in 1948,
leading to four UN resolutions. This was
followed by the Karachi Agreement of July
1949 authorizing the creation of the Cease
Fire Line thereby formalizing the creation
of Indian and Pakistan-controlled parts of
Jammu and Kashmir. The Cease Fire Line
was later re-designated as the Line of
Control as specified in the Simla Agreement.
The second India-Pakistan war over
Kashmir took place in 1965 after Pakistan
launched a covert offensive across the
Cease Fire Line into the Indian part of
Jammu and Kashmir. It lasted over a
month and ended in a United Nations
sponsored ceasefire. In January 1966,
Prime Minister of India Lal Bahadur
Shastri and President of Pakistan
Mohammad Ayub Khan met at Tashkent
and signed a declaration affirming their
commitment to solve their disputes
through peaceful means.
Following the Simla Agreement in
1972, signed after the 1971 India-Pakistan
war that resulted in the formation of
Bangladesh, both countries decided to
end conflict and resolved to settle their
differences through peaceful bilateral
negotiations. Both sides also decided to
withdraw their forces to their side of the
international border; and in Jammu and
Kashmir, the Line of Control resulting
from the cease-fire of 17 December 1971
would be respected by both sides.
Following the demise of Sheikh
Mohammad Abdullah in 1982, his son
HISTORY
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Farooq Abdullah was sworn in as the Chief
Minister of the state. He was dismissed
from power in 1984, but returned in 1986
following a deal with the Congress party.
The state Assembly election of 1987 was
widely believed to be rigged to facilitate
his return to power, thus the people felt
that there was no democratic outlet left
to vent their discontent.4 Forging an
alliance with the Congress party, a mere
two years after his dismissal largely
stripped Farooq Abdullah of the political
mantle he had inherited from his father.5
Many observers see the alleged rigging of
these elections as a turning point in the
growth of Kashmiri nationalism (Amnesty
International 2011).
The armed conflict commenced
between government and armed groups in
the late 1980s in which the latter’s
objectives have been either to form an
independent state of Jammu and Kashmir
or its unification with Pakistan. The first
rebel attacks were the bomb explosions
in Srinagar in July 1988. Since then the
state witnessed a campaign of organised
violence with Jamaat-e-Islami and Jammu
and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF)
being the major players. The former
advocated integration with Pakistan, the
latter favoured independence. The JKLF
was reportedly formed in the 1960s and
emerged as a significant political factor
in the 1980s. Initially it maintained close
ties with the Inter Services Intelligence
(ISI), the Pakistan’s intelligence agency.
But, the two felt apart because of JKLF’s
pro-independence stance. ISI then turned
towards Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, the armed
wing of Jamaat-e-Islami. The Pakistani
authorities’ hostility towards JKLF was
soon reflected on the ground where JKLF
and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen started targeting
each other.6 Gradually, the JKLF lost
its pre-eminent position to Hizb-ul-
Mujahideen. Down the line, many more
groups came into existence and the direct
involvement of foreign nationals increased,
particularly within armed groups like the
Lashkar-e-Taiba. The armed conflict
gradually changed from being primarily
indigenous to being dominated by foreign
or “guest” militants and jihadis by 1994.
Many indigenous militant formations have
dissolved, merged or surrendered and the
JKLF proclaimed it had abandoned arms.7
Some of the significant incidents in the
early days of the insurgency included the
kidnapping of Rubia Syed, the daughter
of the then Union Home Minister. She was
4 Puri, Balraj (2006),.Kashmir’s Journey: From insurgency to militancy to terrorism, pp. 80-84.
5 Ganguly, Sumit (1997), The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War, Hopes of Peace, p. 92.
6 Jones O.B. (2002), Pakistan eye of the storm, p. 83.
7 Verghese B.G. (2007), p. 37.
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set free by her captors in exchange of the
release of several jailed rebels. This was
soon followed by the kidnapping and
killing of H. L. Khera, general manager of
Hindustan Machine Tools and Musheer-
ul-Haq, vice-chancellor of University of
Kashmir. There was also a large scale
exodus of Kashmiri Pandits from the
Kashmir valley. According to official
sources, some 55,000 families were
affected as they moved to Jammu, Delhi
and other places (Government of India,
Ministry of Home Affairs 2009). In the
course of the conflict, religious places
became the soft target of the rebels. In
1993, rebels who were holed up inside
Hazratbal shrine in Srinagar were flush
out by the security forces. In 1995, security
forces again launched an operation against
rebels in Charar-e-Sharief town. The Jama
Masjid in Pulwama district was also
attacked by unidentified terrorists in
December 2000 wounding several
worshippers. The shrine of Sheikh
Nooruddin Noorani located inside the
premises of Charar-e-Sharief shrine was
attacked killing four worshippers and
wounding 60 others in June 2001. The
Raghunath temple in Jammu was attacked
in March 2002 killing several worshippers.
Some other high profile incidents include
the attack on the state Assembly complex
located in Srinagar that killed 36 people
in 2001; the killing of Minister of State
for Power, Ghulam Hassan Bhat in a
landmine explosion in 2000; and the
killing of 36 persons in an attack on an
Army cantonment at Kaluchak in Jammu
in 2002.
In April 1990, Jamaat-e-Islami, Hizb-
ul-Mujahideen, People’s League, Islamic
Jamat-i-Tulba, and Islamic Students
League were banned. The Armed Forces
(Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers
Act, 1990 came into force with effect from
July 1990 in the districts of Anangtnag,
Baramulla, Badgam, Kupwara, Pulwama
and Srinagar; and areas falling within 20
km. of the LoC in the districts of Rajouri
and Poonch. It was subsequently extended
to Jammu region in August 2001. Amidst
factional rivalry among armed groups, the
anti-Indian politicians made some effort
to present a united front8 and founded the
All-Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC),
a conglomerate of political, social and
religious organisations, in 1993 as a
political front to further the cause of
Kashmiri separatism. These organisations
espoused different ideologies and
ambitions ranging from independence for
Jammu and Kashmir to accession to
8 Jones O. B. (2002), pp. 85-6.
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Pakistan to varying degrees of partition
and greater autonomy.9 It suffered a split
into two factions in 2003 led by Mirwaiz
Omar Farooq and Syed Ali Shah Geelani
respectively.
In 1999, Indian forces successfully
evicted intruding Pakistani soldiers out of
the Kargil area. This operation lasted over
two months. In 2000, the state Assembly
adopted a resolution accepting the report
of the State Autonomy Committee that
recommended greater autonomy. It was
summarily rejected by the Central
government. In 2000, the Hizb-ul
Mujahideen offered a ceasefire to facilitate
talks with the Central government. But it
withdrew the ceasefire when Pakistan was
not included in the talks. Later that year,
the security forces suspended combat
operation against rebels during the holy
month of Ramadan. The ceasefire
continued for six months till 23 May 2001.
Incidents of violence declined
considerably from 2002 onwards. But the
state again erupted into civil unrest after
the state government decided to transfer
100 acres of forest land to Shri Amaranth
Shrine Board in 2008. The significant
political fallout was the fall of the Congress
party-led state government after its
coalition partner, the People Democratic
Party (PDP), pulled out opposing the land
transfer. The Board also later gave up the
claim on the forest land after the state
government promised to provide all
facilities to pilgrims going to the shrine.
The civil unrest, marked by clashes
between civilian protestors and security
forces, broke out again in 2010 and lasted
over three months (June to September)
killing over 150 people, mostly civilians.
The unrest was spearheaded by Syed Ali
Shah Geelani-led faction of the All Parties
Hurriyat Conference against the alleged
excesses committed by security forces.
When the state government failed to
control the situation, the Central
government sent an all political party
delegation to the state in September 2010.
The delegation met representatives of
various political parties as well as
separatist leaders. Following the visit, the
Central government initiated a number of
peace initiatives, popularly known as the
Eight-point Peace Formula. This was
followed by the appointment of three
interlocutors to begin “sustained and
uninterrupted dialogue” with “all shades
of opinion” in the state towards a
resolution of Kashmir problem.
9 Verghese B.G. (2007), p. 55.




W hen British India waspartitioned into the
independent states of India and Pakistan,
the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir
had the option of joining either of the two.
Hari Singh who was unable to take a final
decision on the matter signed a Standstill
Agreement with Pakistan to ensure that
trade, travel and communication
continued. Before a similar agreement was
signed with India the Pakistani authorities
cut off essential supplies to the state and
began an invasion. This compelled Hari
Singh to seek India’s assistance to repel
the intruders and in return cede the
princely state to India through an
Instrument of Accession. Indian troops
were immediately deployed there.
However a large part of the state had been
occupied by Pakistan before the Indian
troops arrived. India raised the matter at
the United Nations Security Council which
passed several resolutions. The first
resolution of January 1948 urged both
parties to take measures to improve the
situation and inform the Council of any
material change in the situation. The
second resolution of April 1948 authorized
the setting up of a UN Commission for
mediation. The third resolution of August
1948 was the most significant one and
contained three parts. Part I proposed a
ceasefire order. Part II was related to
persuading upon Pakistan to withdraw its
forces, while India was required to reduce
the strength of its forces. Part III stated
that both governments reaffirm that the
future status of Jammu and Kashmir shall
be determined in accordance with the will
of the people.  India promised to fulfill Part
III only after the provisions of Part I and
Part II were implemented. The UN
Commission also assured India that the
plebiscite proposal would not be binding
upon India if Pakistan did not implement
Parts I and II.10 However, Pakistan failed
to fulfill the preconditions and instead
consolidated its position in the territory
it had already occupied. A few months
later, in 1949, a Cease Fire Line came into
being following the Karachi Agreement
between India, Pakistan and the United
Nations in accordance with the United
10 Jagmohan (1991), My Frozen Turbulence in Kashmir, pp. 35-110.
CONFLICT IN JAMMU AND KASHMIR
17
Nations resolution of 13 August 1948 and
divided Jammu and Kashmir between
India and Pakistan. Thus the issue has
both internal and external aspects. The
former concerns relations between the
people of Jammu and Kashmir and Indian
state, while the latter concerns Pakistan’s
aggressive role. It has been pointed out
that the people of the state are obviously
an interested party but not a third party.11
Pakistan argued that Jammu and
Kashmir should have become its territory
since the state has a Muslim majority. It
alleged the then Hindu ruler of the state
was pressurised to accede to India.
Therefore, Pakistan maintained that the
accession was a fraudulent one. It also
accused India of violating the commitment
to hold a plebiscite on the future of the
state. Therefore, it maintained that India
is forcefully occupying a large part of the
state. It countered India’s claim of Jammu
and Kashmir being an integral part of
India on the following grounds: a) The
disputed character of Jammu and
Kashmir has been recognized by the
United Nations, accepted by both India
and Pakistan and endorsed by the
international community. b) The Line of
Control in the disputed area of Jammu and
Kashmir is not an international boundary
and recognized as such by India; c) There
is complete alienation in the Indian
occupied Kashmir (IoK) against the
Indian rule; and d) Pakistan and India in
the joint statement of 6 January 2004 are
committed to seeking a final settlement
of the dispute.12
India has maintained that accession
was “completely valid” in terms of the
Government of India Act 1935, Indian
Independence Act 1947 and international
laws; and was total and irrevocable.
Therefore, the state is an integral part of
India. It accused Pakistan of illegally
occupying parts of the state and for
promoting a “proxy war” and providing
military support to armed groups. India
wanted Pakistan to vacate the territory it
illegally occupies.
The dispute continued to the key
stumbling block in the relation between
the two South Asian neighbours. Pakistan
maintained that this dispute is the core
issue in its relationship with India and
peace and stability of the region. In
Pakistan’s official view, the dispute is the
primary cause of its tensions with India
and all other bilateral problems are
secondary. Former Pakistan President
Pervez Musharraf maintained that there
was no other dispute between India and
11 Verghese B.G. (2007), p. 5.
12 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kashmir Dispute: Background, Government of Pakistan, available at http://www.mofa.gov.pk/
Pages/Brief.htm (Accessed on 01 March 2011).
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Pakistan, except Kashmir.13 Furthermore,
Pakistan usually condemned the alleged
human rights violations committed by
Indian troops in the state and urged the
international community to stop being
“silent spectators”. Pakistan has sought
the intervention of the international
community, particularly the United States
of America. The International Crisis Group
observed that Pakistan’s policy towards
Kashmir is complex and multi-
dimensional, shaped by both internal and
external factors.14 The issue is used for
diverse purposes, “ranging from nation
building to regime legitimacy”. It gains or
loses prominence as a result of domestic
and external factors. Talat Masood, a
retired Pakistani army officer, observed:
Pakistan’s position has been that
Jammu and Kashmir is disputed
territory and India is in unlawful
occupation of it and that the right of
the people to determine their future
on the basis of UN resolutions must
be granted to them. Pakistan’s claim
on Kashmir is based on the state’s
Muslim majority population and its
geographic contiguity, the same
principle that was applied in the
creation of India and Pakistan at the
time of independence in 1947 …
From a Pakistani perspective
Kashmir is the core issue and the root
cause of tension with India. Pakistan
has made great sacrifices to pursue
a proactive Kashmir policy and its
defense and foreign policy is
significantly influenced by this
attitude.15
India maintained that the matter had
already been settled, so there is no scope
for third party intervention. It also argued
that the UN resolutions envisaging the
holding of a plebiscite on the future of the
state have become obsolete with the
passage of time when several elections
were held in recent past to elect their
representatives. Indian preferred to discuss
the illegal occupation of part of the state
by Pakistan. In Balraj Puri’s words:
The threat from Pakistan to
Kashmiri self-respect and identity on
the one hand and Gandhi’s high
idealism and Nehru’s appreciation of
Kashmiri aspirations on the other
provided the moral, emotional and
ideological basis of Kashmir’s
association with the rest of India.
There were, however, divergent
perceptions in Srinagar and Delhi of
the fateful decision of the Kashmiris
to accede to the Indian Union. The
13 International Crisis Group (2003), p. 1.
14 International Crisis Group (2003), p. 1.
15 Masood, Talat (2006), Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy, pp. 45-49.
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rest of the nation regarded it just as
another instance of the process of
integration of the princely states. But
for the Kashmiri Muslims it was an
enabling- provision to seek the help
of a powerful neighbour to protect
their identity from an aggressor.16
Human rights issues
Since the beginning of the armed
conflict between the government and the
armed groups organised violence has
almost become an everyday occurrence
in several parts of the state. The state is
one of the world’s most heavily
militarized places where special laws are
currently promulgated. The Armed Forces
(Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers
Act, 1990 was promulgated since 1990
to combat the rebels in the erstwhile
districts of Anangtnag, Baramulla,
Badgam, Kupwara, Pulwama and
Srinagar, and areas falling within 20 km
of the Line of Control in the erstwhile
districts of Rajouri and Poonch. It was
then extended to Jammu region in August
2001. Under this Act (popularly known
as AFSPA), the members of the armed
forces are given special powers while
operating in areas already designated as
“disturbed areas”. The special powers
allow any commissioned officer or
equivalent rank in the armed forces to “if
he is of opinion that it is necessary so to
do for the maintenance of public order,
after giving such due warning as he may
consider necessary, fire upon or otherwise
use force, even to the causing of death,
against any person who is acting in
contravention of any law or order for the
time being in force in the disturbed area
prohibiting the assembly of five or more
persons or the carrying of weapons or of
things capable of being used as weapons
or of firearms, ammunition or explosive
substances … arrest, without warrant,
any persons who has committed a
cognizable offence or against whom a
reasonable suspicion exists that he has
committed or is about to commit a
cognizable offence and may use such force
as may be necessary to effect the arrest;
enter and search, without warrant, any
premises to make any such arrest as
aforesaid or to recover any person
believed to be wrongful restrained or
confined or any property reasonably
suspected to be stolen property or any
arms, ammunition or explosive
substances believed to be unlawful kept
in such premises, and may for that
purpose use such force as may be
necessary, and seize any such property,
arms, ammunition or explosive
16 Puri, Balraj (1990), The Challenge of Kashmir, pp. 191-192.
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substances (The Armed  Forces (Jammu
and Kashmir) Special Powers Act, 1990).
But the Act has been contentious since
its inception. Several observers have long
argued that AFSPA is unconstitutional
and violates international humanitarian
law. There have been allegations of the
special powers being misused by the
members of the armed forces. Several
civil society organizations have been
demanding its removal and the
withdrawal of troops. They claimed that
AFSPA has contributed to the escalation
of people’s discontentment thus boosting
the morale of the armed groups. The
Act, according to them, is thus
counterproductive and only accentuated
a vicious cycle of violence. Lending
support to the popular voices against
AFSPA the local political leadership also
favoured its removal or amendment so
that armed forces involved in rights
violations could be held accountable
through the civilian legal process.
However, there is no consensus among the
political parties. The Bharatiya Janata
Party (BJP) has been opposing any
attempt to dilute the Act saying it would
demoralise the armed forces. Those who
advocated the necessity of AFSPA felt that
the situation in the state is disturbing
considering the activities of various armed
groups. The Indian armed forces also
maintained that the removal would have
disastrous consequences on the fight
against the armed groups. The armed
forces insist “legal protection” is a must
for the troops to efficiently perform their
tasks. The Indian Army Chief, General
V. K. Singh even publicly stated that the
demand for the removal of AFSPA was
made for narrow political gains and
emphasized that soldiers operating in a
hostile environment need legal protection
to ensure that they perform their tasks
efficiently (Indian Express 26.6.2010).
The Indian Air Chief P.V. Naik also
advocated that “a soldier fighting anywhere
at the request of the government and not
voluntarily, must have legal protection
otherwise he would be left inefficient to
complete the job in which either the Central
or the state government has interest in”
(Daily Excelsior 5.10.2010).
Apart from AFSPA, the Jammu and
Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978 (PSA)
is a preventive detention law where a
person can be jailed without trial for two
years to maintain public order.  Estimates
of the number of detainees under this Act
in the last two decades could range from
8,000-20,000.17 Once a detention order
has been issued, the grounds of detention
must be provided to the detainee within
17 Amnesty International (2011), A ‘Lawless Law’: Detentions under the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, p. 4.
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five to ten days of the detention, but
without the necessity to disclose facts that
the detaining authority “considers to be
against the public interest to disclose.”
Amnesty International has expressed
serious concern at the alleged misuse of
the Act and urged the state authorities to
repeal it.
Protests against alleged human rights
abuses have been a regular feature in
Kashmir valley since the commencement
of the armed conflict. In many of these
cases, the protesters’ demanded the
removal of security force camps and check
posts, punishment of the securitymen
allegedly involved in rape/murder to the
broader demands for the repeal of AFSPA,
demilitarization and azadi. The 2010
public uprisings were also against the
alleged excesses committed by the armed
forces particularly the alleged fake
encounter at Kupwara in May 2009 and
the subsequent killing of a teenager in
police firing in Srinagar on June that year.
These incidents were sufficient to kick-
start a fresh uprising. According to the
Indian army’s own estimates, a total of
104 armymen were found guilty of human
rights violations between 1990 and 2010.
It did not reveal the nature of the
complaints and the kind of punishment
given to the guilty. At least 1,514
complaints of human rights violations
were filed during the period and 1,508
complaints were investigated (six cases
still being investigated). According to their
own admission, about 97 per cent of the
complaints were false (Times of India &
Zee News 16.10.2010).
The Central government has also
acknowledged some human rights
violations. In June 2010, Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh also promised to act to
ensure that security forces respect the
rights of civilians while tackling terrorism.
He said “I am aware of some complaints
related to human rights. On this issue, the
government policy is to protect the human
rights of the people even when dealing with
terrorism. The security forces in Jammu
and Kashmir have been strictly instructed
to respect the rights of the civilians. We
will act to remove any deficiency in the
implementation of these instructions” (The
Hindu 8.6.2010 & NDTV 7.6.2010).
Azadi, autonomy or self-rule
Azadi is the Urdu translation of two
concepts in English, viz. independence and
freedom.18 Hence, it has different
meanings for different people. For some,
it could mean greater autonomy; and for
others, independence either from India or
Pakistan, or both. Yet it could also mean
18 Puri, Balraj (2009), Azadi, Autonomy and Self-Rule vs. Freedom, p. 34.
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freedom from the fear of rebels and
security forces, self-respect and dignity.
Whatever the interpretations, azadi
signifies freedom from Indian rule. Syed
Ali Shah Geelani sees azadi as freedom
from Indian rule and occupation.19 Geelani
on 25 September 2010 publicly stressed
his preferred choice as accession to
Pakistan. He, however, stressed that he
would ultimately go by the consensus.
Geelani defended his “first option” of
accession on three main counts: a) the
option of independent Jammu and
Kashmir was not viable as India, Pakistan
and China are not in favour of the idea
and without their collective support this
proposition was neither feasible nor
sustainable; b) that the UN resolution
limiting the choice of accession between
India and Pakistan continued to remain
in force; and c) that their “bitter experience
of Indian occupation” left them the only
other course of accession with Pakistan
(Kashmir Times 25.9.2010). Mohammad
Yasin Malik who pleaded for complete
independence wanted the involvement of
the people of the state in a dialogue process
between India and Pakistan on the
dispute. He maintained that both
countries were trying to impose a solution
on the people whereas according to him
the people must decide about their destiny
by themselves. Yet Mirwaiz Umar Farooq
maintained that Jammu and Kashmir is
a disputed land and not part of India. He
stressed that the core issue of the dispute
is neither development nor economic
packages but the “strong sentiments of
freedom.” By contrast, the mainstream
political parties like National Conference
and Peoples Democratic Party advocated
autonomy and self-rule as against azadi.
Autonomy is a device to allow ethnic
or other groups claiming a distinct identity
to exercise direct control over affairs of
special concern to them, while allowing
the larger entity those powers which cover
common interests.20 The state has been
accorded special status under Article 370
of the Constitution of India that provides
substantial autonomy since October 1949.
Down the line, it has altered to a greater
extent. Further, there are different views
for and against its abrogation. The
National Conference wanted it to
strengthen because the party maintained
the Article 370 had eroded in the past. The
party feared that its abrogation would
encourage separatists. On the other hand,
the Bharatiya Janata Party wanted to
scrap it so as to ensure implementation of
the “one nation, one flag, one constitution.”
19 For more detail see, Sikand, Yoginder (2010) Jihad, Islam and Kashmir: Syed Ali Shah Geelani’s Political Project, pp.
125-134.
20 Ghai, Yash (2000), Ethnicity and Autonomy: A Framework for Analysis, p. 8.
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Those favoring its abrogation argued that
it is creating “psychological barriers”
thereby encouraging separatist tendencies.
They maintained that since being a
temporary arrangement it should be allow
to “erode gradually”.
The National Conference has been
advocating the restoration of autonomy
which it believes will be crucial to the
resolution of the current dispute. The party
reiterated that under the Instrument of
Accession, the division between Centre and
state was clearly demarcated with all the
powers of the legislation resting with the
state other than those concerning defence,
external affairs and communication. It
alleged that over the years the autonomy
had “evaporated unconstitutionally” which
it claimed is the reason for the discontent
of the people. In 1996, the National
Conference government appointed the
State Autonomy Committee and the
Regional Autonomy Committee to
examine the issue of autonomy.  The
former was entrusted with the inter-state
aspect, i.e., the relationship between the
Central government and Jammu and
Kashmir; the other was responsible for
intra-state aspect, particularly the
relationship between the state’s three
regions of Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh.
In 2000, the state assembly passed a
resolution accepting the report of the State
Autonomy Committee that recommended
greater autonomy including the
restoration of the pre-1953 constitutional
status of the state. The main
recommendations are:
1) That the word “temporary” be deleted
from the title of Part XXI and the
heading of Article 370 of the
Constitution of India.
2) Matters in the Union List not
connected with the three subjects of
Defence, External Affairs and
Communications and/or Ancillary
thereto but made applicable should be
excluded from their application of the
state.
3) Since elections to the state legislature
are held under laws made by the state
legislature, Article 324 should
continue to apply in the manner and
way it was applicable in 1950/1954.
4) The imposition of a state of
Emergency shall be subject to the state
government’s concurrence “provided
that this request for concurrence of the
Government of the State shall be
subject to whatever decision the State
Assembly shall take within two
months ... (failing which) the
proclamation of Emergency shall be
deemed to have been revoked.
5) Article 218 be omitted in its
application to the State ... (and) the
State Legislature re-enact the
provisions as they existed ... before the
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enforcement of the J&K Constitution
(First Amendment) Act of 1959.
6) A separate chapter on Fundamental
Rights needs to be included in the
Jammu and Kashmir Constitution ...
(for a) situation where Directive
Principles do not apply and
Fundamental Rights apply is not a
happy one.21
The resolution was summarily rejected
by the Central government essentially
because it was a plea for the restoration
of the pre-1953 status to the state. This is
evident in this excerpt of the Union
Cabinet’s response to the autonomy
resolution:
The government is committed to
the promotion of federal harmony
by ensuring a partnership
of the Centre and the states …
The government reaffirms its
commitment to continuing its
endeavour to evolve a broad
consensus on the implementation of
steps for wide-ranging devolution
of powers to the state that leads
to efficiency in administration,
acceleration in development and the
fullest realisation of the creative
potential of all sections of our people.
… In the above context, the Cabinet
finds the resolution passed by the
State Assembly of Jammu and
Kashmir endorsing the report of
the State Autonomy Committee
unacceptable. The Cabinet feels that
the acceptance of this resolution
would set the clock back and reverse
the natural process of harmonising
the aspiration of the people of
Jammu and Kashmir with the
integrity of the nation. Most of the
recommendations contained in
the report of the State Autonomy
Committee seek to reverse the
application of constitutional
provisions to the state of Jammu
and Kashmir which may not only
adversely affect the interests of the
people of the state but would also
tantamount to removal of some of the
essential safeguards enshrined in our
constitution.22
The Regional Autonomy Committee
report advocated the reorganisation of
the state into eight new provinces, each
with an elected provincial council whose
boundaries are to be defined on ethno-
linguistic lines, framing it more in terms
of a grant of autonomy rather than
21 Frontline (2000), From the State Autonomy Committee Report, Frontline 17(14).
22 South Asia Terrorism Portal, New Delhi.
23 Chaturvedi, Sanjay (2005), The Ethno and the Geo: A New Look into the Issue of Kashmir’s Autonomy, pp. 139-72.
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demands for autonomy.23 The Committee
recommended the bifurcation of Kashmir
into three new provinces, Ladakh into two,
and Jammu into three respectively.
However, the report has been kept well
hidden from public view. It has been said
that it holds out more fundamental threats
to the prospect of a secular and democratic
Jammu and Kashmir than any number of
terrorists do.24
In its 2008 election manifesto the
National Conference reiterated that
“the restoration of state’s autonomy
continues to be the bedrock of our policy
and agenda. Our party will continue to
strive for the complete restoration of the
special status that formed the basis of
Srinagar-Delhi relationship after
prolonged deliberations between the
leadership of India and Jammu and
Kashmir”. In the wake of the public
protests in 2010, the Congress party-led
Central government had even indicated its
willingness to consider autonomy within
the constitution if there was a consensus
among the political parties. Opposing any
move to grant greater autonomy the
Bharatiya Janata Party stressed that if
autonomy is granted other states would
also seek the same. Thus it feared the
prospect of balkanisation of the country.
Some other parties even suggested some
kind of political and economic packages
including broadening of the framework of
autonomy within the constitution. These
parties, however, did not elaborate.
The National Conference’s arch rival
the Peoples Democratic Party maintained
that autonomy was not the solution
because the dispute had international
ramifications. Instead, the party advocated
step by step integration of the Indian and
Pakistani Kashmirs in various fields like
trade, travel, institutions and legislature.
The party stressed that the dispute could
not be resolved on the basis of exclusively
intrastate level initiatives and hence
requires a combination of intrastate
measures with interstate and suprastate
measures. It insisted that self-rule was a
“formulation that would integrate the
region without disturbing the extant
sovereign authority over delimited
territorial space”. The PDP argued that
self-rule is a way of “sharing sovereignty”,
without need or commitment to political
merging. The governance structure under
this formula is the cross-border institution
of “Regional Council” of “Greater Jammu
and Kashmir”. According to this scheme
the Council will replace the existing Upper
House of state assembly and its members
24 Swami, Praveen (1999), Jammu and Kashmir: A communal divide.
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will be from all parts of the state. The
formulation of self-rule has three
subcomponents:
a) A new political superstructure that
integrates the region and empowers
sub-regions;
b) A phased economic integration that
transcends borders; and
c) Constitutional restructuring that
ensures sharing of sovereignty without
comprising political sovereignty of
either nation state.25
Division within
The state of Jammu and Kashmir is
multi-lingual, multi-cultural and multi-
religious consisting of three geographical
regions: Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh.
One of the visible impacts of the current
conflict has been the gradual polarisation
of its people along regional lines. It would
not be out of context to note that the
people of Jammu and Ladakh often
accused both the Central and state
governments of neglecting their regions
and for giving undue importance to the
Kashmir valley. Several organisations
maintained that the government has been
neglecting their regions to appease the
separatists. The divide snowballed into a
major controversy in 2008 when the state
government decided to transfer 100 acres
of forest land to the Shri Amaranth Shrine
Board. The impasse had a religious
dimension when people living in the
Kashmir valley denounced the land
transfer. Following intense pressure the
state government revoked the land
transfer order, but violent agitations
broke out in Jammu. The impasse was
finally resolved with the intervention
of the Central government. Following
this impasse, several Jammu-based
organisations re-intensified the demand
for the bifurcation of the state to facilitate
the creation of separate Jammu state.
Chaturvedi listed the following factors
driving the demand for its bifurcation:
a) Historically, the present
conglomeration of three
heterogeneous regions of Jammu,
Kashmir and Ladakh was never an
organic political entity;
b) There are inherent inter-regional
contradictions in terms of history,
physiography, ethnicity, language and
culture;
c) This sharp inter-regional contradiction
has a “spillover” in the political
perception of the three dominant
communities of the respective regions
and integration is absent;
25 Jammu and Kashmir Peoples Democratic Party (2008), Jammu & Kashmir: The Self-Rule Framework for Resolution.
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d) Political domination of Kashmiri
Muslims and their discrimination
against Jammu and Ladakh kept the
latter feeling neglected. Ladakh has
persistently raised the issue of Islamic
domination; and
e) The Hindus and Buddhists of the
state are apprehensive of the likely
demographic change in their
respective regions due to large-scale
Muslim influx from the Kashmir
Valley.26
On the other hand, the Ladakh Union
Territory Front has been demanding union
territory for Ladakh citing their cultural,
linguistic and geographical uniqueness. In
2000, the Ladakh Autonomous Hill
Development Council also passed an
official resolution in favour of the union
territory. Supporters of new state and
union territory argued that reorganisation
would not only result in better governance,
greater economic opportunities and a large
share of political power, but Jammu and
Ladakh will also be able to distance
themselves from militancy.27 However, the
demand is most likely to be opposed by
the people of the valley.
Migration of Kashmiri Pandits
Insecurity due to armed conflict in the
1990s28 compelled around 55,000
Kashmiri Pandit families to flee their homes
and took shelter in Jammu, Delhi and
elsewhere in the country.29 Despite being
numerically small, the community was a
“highly visible” group30, who were
traditionally land owning, educated and
elitist. They were able to convey their
distress at being forced to live for two
decades in temporary shelters with minimal
basic facilities. Politicians and other leaders
talked of their return, but none could
guarantee their safety. It must be noted,
however, that there were Pandit families
who did not migrate in the 1990s, and some
of the migrants later returned to the valley.31
This incident dented the image of the
majority Muslim population of the valley,
since most of them recognized the Pandits
to be an integral part of the state. While
Kashmiri Muslims and Pandits follow
different religions, they share many
cultural practices that are a fusion of the
elements of their respective religious
practices as well as the uniquely Kashmiri
devotional and philosophical norms.32
26 Chaturvedi (2005), p. 159.
27 Chaturvedi (2005), p. 158.
28 Hassan, H. W. (2010), Migration of Kashmiri Pandits: Kashmiriyat Challenged?
29 Government of India (2009), Annual Report 2008-2009, New Delhi: Ministry of Home Affairs.
30 Seema Sh. (2009), Conflict induced displacement: the Pandits of Kashmir, pp. 31-37.
31 Hassan, H. W. (2010), p. 7.
32 Punjabi, R. 1992, Kashmir: The Bruised Identity, pp. 131-53.
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The government has claimed to have
made several measures to facilitate their
return. But, these efforts have met with
very little success. This has led to
governmental efforts focusing on
providing housing facilities to the
displaced families by constructing
dwelling units in places such as Jammu,
Budgam, Kupwara, and so on. In 2008,
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
initiated a special economic package
amounting to Rs. 1,618 crore to facilitate
their return. Under this package some
6000 youths are supposed to be given
government jobs, monetary support is
also to be provided for the construction
of new houses, and compensation for the
property lost. As a part of this package,
the state government had also reportedly
created 3000 supernumerary posts in
2009, and issued appointment orders to
several candidates. As on 29 December
2010, as many as 4621 families
reportedly showed their willingness to
return to the valley. But, the Central
government admitted that till December
2010 “no family has returned”, but
maintained that “providing employment
is expected to be the beginning of return
of Kashmiri migrants to valley as it is
presumed that their families shall follow
them subsequently”.33
33 Government of India, 2010, Status report – PM’s package for return and rehabilitation of Kashmiri migrants, (Status on
29.12.2010) New Delhi: Ministry of Home Affairs.
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INSTITUTIONS
I n this series of backgrounders,an institution is taken to be a
public system of rules which defines offices
and positions with their rights and duties,
powers and immunities, and the like.
These rules specify certain forms of action
as permissible, others as forbidden; and
they provide for certain penalties and
defenses, and so on, when violation occur.
Thus an institution may be thought of in
two ways: first as an abstract object, that
is, as a possible form of conduct expressed
by a system of rules; and second, as the
realisation in the thought and conduct of
certain persons at a certain time and place
of the actions specified by these rules.34
The picture of conflict in Jammu and
Kashmir has place for institutions in both
the senses that John Rawls has suggested.
The present crisis can be seen as a result
of the inability to enforce a set of abstract
rules leading to the emergence of new
institutional practices. These could include
the government and its various agencies,
armed groups and other socio-political
organisations. All have come to be
associated in different capacities in the
course of the conflict. The initial reaction
to the conflict has been to treat it as a
case of non-implementation of rules, that
is, as a law and order problem. This helped
the rebels tap the discontent that emerged
from the alleged human rights violations
by the government forces. The
dissatisfaction on the ground was
compounded by the inability of the
successive governments to meet the
growing aspirations of its people. In
practice this widespread discontent and
responses to it, have created non-state
institutions of the armed and unarmed
groups.
South Asia Terrorism Portal listed as
many as 35 active and not-so-active armed
groups involved in the current conflict. The
list included, among others, Lashkar-e-
Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Harkat-ul-
Mujahideen and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen. The
Hizb-ul-Mujahideen is one of the oldest
and active groups. It started its operations
around 1989 with the stated aim of
integrating Jammu and Kashmir to
Pakistan. Other groups also advocated
similar objective and challenge India’s
34 Rawls, John (1999), A Theory of Justice, pp. 47-101.
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control over the state. Most of them were
raised outside Indian part of Jammu and
Kashmir with active support of Pakistani
government, and then extended operations
into Indian side. Most of them have been
banned by the Indian government under
the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002.
Armed groups created para-statal
organisations in the areas they operated
in that lay down a set of rules and have
the means and resources to enforce them.
Thus, they not only monitored the
government but also administered their
own social welfare services to gain public
support from their distribution of public
goods. In this way, many of the functions
which are within the domain of the state
institutions have been encroached upon by
the rebel institutions. They also boycott
all Indian national events like
Independence Day and Republic Day
celebrations. The overall impact has been
the dilution of the legitimacy of state
institutions.
A striking aspect of the long-running
conflict has been the proliferation of a
large number of socio-political groups like
the All Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC)
and the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation
Front (JKLF). They all have played
significant role in the course of this
conflict. The APHC, formed around 1993,
is an alliance of several social, political and
religious groups to further the cause of
Kashmiri nationalism. Around the same
time, the JKLF transformed itself from a
violent to non-violent group. Both have
considerable influence and been
spearheading almost all the anti-
government agitations in the state.




A part from the usual call formeaningful dialogue with all
the disgruntled groups of the state, the
effort of the Centre and the state
governments have so far made very little
success on the ground. As a result the state
continues to be affected by organised
violence and political agitation with
significant support from across the border.
In addition to death and injuries, normal
development works have been affected.
Several development projects have failed
to complete in time leading to the
escalation of the costs. And, educational
institutions have virtually forced to shut
down. In the last two decades, over 13,500
civilians and 4,500 securitymen have lost
their lives in the state due to the conflict
(Annual Report 2008-09, Ministry of
Home Affairs, Government of India). It is
thus worthwhile to know the government
policies and counter-insurgency strategies
that have military, political and socio-
economic dimensions.
Firstly, the tendency to view the
conflict as a law and order problem and
rebels as criminals, misguided youth
or terrorists has contributed to the
willingness to use force. The security-
related measures initiated over the years
included the enforcement of the Armed
Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special
Powers Act, 1990 since 1990 in several
areas of the state. Under this Act, the
members of the armed forces were given
special powers while operating in areas
officially designated as “disturbed areas”.
It has been contentious one since the
inception with the allegations of the
special powers being misused by the
members of government forces. The
continued implementation of AFSPA has
resulted an unprecedented people’s
uprising demanding its repeal. The overall
security arrangement is supervised by the
Unified Headquarters, chaired by the
Chief Minister of the state, with senior
government officials, Army, Central
paramilitary forces and other security
agencies has been functioning with the aim
of ensuring proper coordination among all
the agencies and to regularly monitor
security situation. The Central ministries
of home and defence also monitored the
situation in tandem with the state
authorities and the Central ministry of
external affairs. While the Army and other
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Central security forces are assisting the
local police, the Central government also
reimbursed the expenditure incurred by
the state government on a variety of
security-related measures. Jammu and
Kashmir is the only state in the country
where a separate department—the
Department of Jammu and Kashmir
Affairs in the Union Ministry of Home
Affairs––deals with the constitutional
provisions of the state and all other
matters relating to it, excluding those with
which the Union Ministry of External
Affairs is concerned. The government
deployed a large number of troops along
the Line of Control to prevent the
infiltration of foreign terrorists and to
other areas of the state to help restore
normalcy.
Secondly, the Central assistance to
the state government has increased
considerably over the years for promoting
faster economic development and more so
to wean the public away from the armed
groups. It is also one of the special
category states in the country where the
Centre funds up to 90 per cent of its capital
budget requirements. One of the major
economic development initiatives
undertaken was the Prime Minister’s
Reconstruction Plan initiated in 2004 that
involved an outlay of approximately Rs.
28000 crores for various projects aimed
at expanding economic infrastructure and
provision of basic services, imparting a
thrust to employment and income
generation activities, and providing
rehabilitation for people affected by armed
conflict. This plan is being implemented
by several Central ministries in
consultation with state authorities. The
whole project is jointly monitored by the
Union Ministry of Home Affairs and the
Planning Commission of India. Besides,
several Central ministries have been
providing funds through their respective
budgets for the development of their
respective sectors. The state government
itself is also implementing its own
development programmes. In 2010, the
Centre set up an expert group in the
context of enhancing the employment
opportunities and to formulate a jobs plan
involving both the public and private
sectors, especially for the youth. Key
recommendations of their report,
submitted in March 2011, are:
a) A scheme to provide placement-linked,
market driven skill training to 50,000
to 100,000 youth in 3 to 5 years.
b) To identify 10 to 20 companies across
industry sectors to partner with an
educational institution and run special
training programs to enhance
employability of 8000 youth per annum
in the state over a five-year period.
c) 5000 scholarships per annum to be
awarded for the next 5 years. Out of
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the total, 4500 scholarships (90 per
cent) could be for general degree
courses, 250 for engineering (5 per
cent) and 250 for medical studies
(5 per cent). This will benefit 25,000
students.
d) Sectoral initiatives to agriculture and
animal husbandry; horticulture;
tourism; handicrafts; micro, small and
medium enterprises and IT&ITES/
BPO.35
Also in 2010, the Centre constituted
two Special Task Forces to examine
the infrastructure needs of Jammu
and Ladakh regions and make
recommendations to overcome the
deficiencies. According to media reports,
the Special Task Forces have recommended
projects amounting about Rs.913 crore.
Thirdly, the political response to the
conflict primarily focuses on constant
engagement with dissenting groups
including Government of Pakistan to
“people to people” contact across two parts
of the state. One of the significant steps
was the suspension of combat operation
by security forces against armed groups
for six months starting from the holy
month of Ramadan, i.e., 27.11.2000 to
23.5.2001. The state government had also
devised rehabilitation schemes so as to
encourage the rebels back to normal life.
Under these schemes, each surrenderee is
eligible for certain benefits. The most
recent rehabilitation scheme intended to
facilitate the return of former rebels who
had crossed over to PoK/Pakistan for arm
training but had given up insurgent
activities and are willing to return back.
In order to enhance “people to people”
contact across LoC the government
initiated Cross LoC Travel and Cross LoC
Trade. The fortnightly Srinagar-
Muzaffarabad bus service started in April
2005, followed by Poonch-Rawalakote
bus service in June 2006 have been made
weekly from September 2008 onwards
in view of the encouraging response.
The Cross LoC Trade on Srinagar-
Muzaffarabad axis commenced from
October 2008 onwards.
In September 2010, an all-political
party delegation comprising 34 members
of various political parties visited the state
and met representatives of several political
parties and interest groups. Following this
visit, the Centre initiated a comprehensive
peace plan, popularly known as the Eight-
point Peace Formula. This includes among
others appointment of peace interlocutors,
review of the deployment of security forces,
release of those detained for stone pelting
and review of the cases of all Public Safety
Act detenues. Accordingly, the Centre have
35 For more detail see, Report of the Expert Group to formulate a jobs plan for the state of Jammu and Kashmir, New Delhi:
Office of the Prime Minister of India, 2011.
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released Rs. 100 crore as Special Plan
Assistance and appointed three
interlocutors. The interlocutors are Dilip
Padgaonkar, M. M. Ansari and Radha
Kumar. All of them represent different
walks of life as journalist, economist and
political scientist respectively. They are
entrusted with the task of undertaking a
sustained dialogue with the people of the
state to understand their problems and
chart a future course of action.
Although interrupted on different
occasions, India and Pakistan continue to
engage in bilateral talks to normalize their
relationship. In 1999, the bus service
between Delhi and Lahore was started
with Prime Minister A. B. Vajpayee going
by bus to Lahore and holding a summit
with his Pakistani counterpart Nawaz
Sharif leading to the signing of the Lahore
Declaration in which the two governments
agreed to intensify their efforts to resolve
all issues, including the issue of Jammu
and Kashmir. In July 2000, President of
Pakistan General Pervez Musharraf and
A. B. Vajpayee met at Agra. But the talks
failed.
In 2003, both sides agreed to a formal
ceasefire along the International Border,
the Line of Control and the Actual Ground
Position Line in Jammu and Kashmir. The
ceasefire entered its ninth year in 2011
despite apprehensions of ceasefire
violation by the Pakistani troops. In
January 2004, the two sides resumed the
reconciliation process, described officially
as the composite dialogue, including
Jammu and Kashmir as one of the issues
to be discussed and resolved. This was
followed by several rounds of official
meeting on several issues including
Jammu and Kashmir. In the same year,
air links between the two countries as well
the passenger and freight rail service
between Attari and Lahore were resumed.
From 2008 onwards, both sides agreed to
a series of Kashmir-specific confidence
building measures (CBMs), including that
of LoC Trade.
Above all, since the 1980s, the two
sides started “cricket diplomacy” to help
improve ties. In March 2011, Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh invited
Pakistani leaders to watch the World Cup
semi-final match between Pakistan and
India at Mohali in Punjab. Pakistan Prime
Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani accepted the
invitation and came to watch the match.
OTHER OPTIONS
Noted scholar Asghar Ali Engineer
suggested among others the creation of
more employment opportunities, grant of
complete autonomy and repeal of Armed
Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special
Powers Act as the appropriate measures
to resolve the Kashmir dispute (The
Hindu 26.9.2010). Centre’s peace
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interlocutor Radha Kumar suggested the
involvement of Pakistan in resolving
the dispute (The Hindu, & NDTV,
14.11.2010). Justice K. G. Balakrishnan,
the chairman of National Human Rights
Commission (NHRC) asserted enhancing
the NHRC’s role in the state which
presently has limited jurisdiction over
human rights issues. He believed that the
extension of commission’s jurisdiction
would be beneficial to the common people
who could have recourse to better
redressal of grievances (Deccan Herald
& The Hindu, 25.7.2010). Leading
Kashmiri separatist Syed Ali Shah
Geelani wanted declaration of Jammu
and Kashmir as disputed territory,
demilitarisation, end to human rights
violations, revocation of draconian laws,
and release of Kashmiri prisoners. He
maintained that only tripartite talks can
facilitate the granting of right to self-
determination. Another separatist Yasin
Malik strongly favoured the formation of
core groups in India and Pakistan for
talks with Kashmiri leaders. Mirwaiz
Umar Farooq also suggested the
formation of a Kashmir Committee in the
Indian and Pakistani parliaments that
would exclusively discuss the dispute.
Self-rule is suggested by People
Democratic Party while the National
Conference favours restoration of
autonomy. The current Chief Minister
Omar Abdullah stressed that Jammu and
Kashmir is a political issue which cannot
be addressed through development,
employment or good governance only. He
stressed that it is an issue between India
and Pakistan in which Jammu and
Kashmir is getting smashed in between.
He also stressed the need for an external
dialogue process (India Today & Daily
Excelsior 6.10.2010). Yet others have
advocated third-party mediation/
intervention particularly the United
States of America playing a key role, and
the reorganisation of the state.
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The treaty between the Brit ish
Government on the one part and Maharajah
Gulab Singh of Jammu on the other concluded
on the part of the British Government by
Frederick Currie, Esq. and Brevet-Major
Henry Montgomery Lawrence, acting under
the orders of the Rt. Hon. Sir Henry Hardinge,
G.C.B., one of her Britannic Majesty’s most
Honorable Privy Council, Governor-General of
the possessions of the East India Company, to
direct and control all the affairs in the East
Indies and by Maharajah Gulab Singh in
person - 1846.
Article 1
The British Government transfers and
makes over for ever in independent possession
to Maharajah Gulab Singh and the heirs male
of his body all the hilly or mountainous country
with its dependencies situated to the eastward
of the River Indus and the westward of the River
Ravi including Chamba and excluding Lahol,
being part of the territories ceded to the British
Government by the Lahore State according to
the provisions of Article IV of the Treaty of
Lahore, dated 9th March, 1846.
Article 2
The eastern boundary of the tract
transferred by the foregoing article to Maharajah
Gulab Singh shall be laid down by the
Commissioners appointed by the British
Government and Maharajah Gulab Singh
respectively for that purpose and shall be defined
in a separate engagement after survey.
Article 3
In consideration of the transfer made to him
and his heirs by the provisions of the foregoing
article Maharajah Gulab Singh will pay to the
British Government the sum of seventy-five lakhs
of rupees (Nanukshahee), fifty lakhs to be paid
on or before the 1st October of the current year,
A.D., 1846.
Article 4
The limits of territories of Maharajah Gulab
Singh shall not be at any time changed without
concurrence of the British Government.
Article 5
Maharajah Gulab Singh will refer to the
arbitration of the British Government any
disputes or question that may arise between
himself and the Government of Lahore or any
other neighboring State, and will abide by the
decision of the British Government.
Article 6
Maharajah Gulab Singh engages for himself
and heirs to join, with the whole of his Military
Forces, the British troops when employed within
the hills or in the territories adjoining his
possessions.
Article 7
Maharajah Gulab Singh engages never to
take to retain in his service any British subject
nor the subject of any European or American




(Courtesy: Department of Law, Justice & Parliamentary Affairs,
Government of Jammu and Kashmir)
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Article 8
Maharajah Gulab Singh engages to respect
in regard to the territory transferred to him, the
provisions of Articles  V,  VI and VII of the separate
Engagement between the British Government
and the Lahore Durbar, dated 11th March, 1846.
Article 9
The British Government will give its aid to
Maharajah Gulab Singh in protecting his
territories from external enemies.
Article 10
Maharajah Gulab Singh acknowledges the
supremacy of the British Government and will
in token of such supremacy present annually to
the British Government one horse, twelve shawl
goats of approved breed (six male and six female)
and three pairs of Cashmere shawls.
This Treaty of ten articles has been this day
settled by Frederick Currie, Esq. and Brever-
Major Henry Montgomery Lawrence, acting
under directions of the Rt. Hon. Sir Henry
Hardinge, Governor-General, on the part of the
British Government and by Maharajah Gulab
Singh in person, and the said Treaty has been
this day ratified by the seal of the Rt. Hon. Sir
Henry Hardinge, Governor-General.
Done at Amritsar the sixteenth day of March,
in the year of our Lord one thousand eight
hundred and forty-six, corresponding with the
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Whereas the Indian Independence Act,
1947, provides that as from the fifteenth day
of August, 1947, there shall be set up an
independent Dominion known as INDIA, and
that the Government of India Act 1935, shall
with such omissions, additions, adaptations and
modifications as the Governor General may by
order specify, be applicable to the Dominion of
India.
AND WHEREAS the Government of India Act,
1935, as so adapted by the Governor General,
provides that an Indian State may accede to the
Dominion of India by an Instrument of Accession
executed by the Ruler thereof.
Now, Therefore
I, Shriman Inder Mahinder Rajrajeswar
Maharajadhiraj Shri Hari Singhji, Jammu &
Kashmir Naresh Tatha Tibbet adi Deshadhipati,
Ruler of Jammu & Kashmir State, in the exercise
of my Sovereignty in and over my said State do
hereby execute this my Instrument of Accession
and
1. I hereby declare that I accede to the
Dominion of India with the intent that the
Governor General of India, the Dominion
Legislature, the Federal Court and any other
Dominion authority established for the
purposes of the Dominion shall by virtue of
this my Instrument of Accession but subject
always to the terms thereof, and for the
purposes only of the Dominion, exercise in
relation to the State of Jammu & Kashmir
(hereinafter referred to as “this State”) such
functions as may be vested in them by or
under the Government of India Act, 1935,
as in force in the Dominion of India, on the
15th day of August 1947, (which Act as so
in force is hereafter referred to as “the Act’).
2. I hereby assume the obligation of ensuring
that due effect is given to provisions of the
Act within this State so far as they are
applicable therein by virtue of this my
Instrument of Accession.
3. I accept the matters specified in the schedule
hereto as the matters with respect to which
the Dominion Legislature may make law for
this State.
4. I hereby declare that I accede to the
Dominion of India on the assurance that if
an agreement is made between the Governor
General and the Ruler of this State whereby
any functions in relation to the
administration in this State of any law of the
Dominion Legislature shall be exercised by
the Ruler of the State, then any such
agreement shall be construed and have effect
accordingly.
5. The terms of this my Instrument of
Accession shall not be varied by any
amendment of the Act or the Indian
Independence Act, 1947, unless such
amendment is accepted by me by
Instrument supplementary to this
Instrument.
6. Nothing in this Instrument shall empower
the Dominion Legislature to make any law
for this State authorizing the compulsory
acquisition of land for any purpose, but I
hereby undertake that should the Dominion
for the purpose of a Dominion law which
applies in this State deem it necessary to
Instrument of Accession of Jammu and Kashmir State
(Courtesy: Department of Law, Justice & Parliamentary Affairs,
Government of Jammu and Kashmir)
(APPENDIX II)
CONFLICT IN JAMMU AND KASHMIR
39
acquire any land, I will at their request
acquire the land at their expense, or, if the
land belongs to me transfer it to them on
such terms as may be agreed or, in default
of agreement, determined by an arbitrator
to be appointed by the Chief Justice of India.
7. Nothing in this Instrument shall be deemed
to commit in any way to acceptance of any
future constitution of India or to fetter my
discretion to enter into agreement with the
Government of India under any such future
constitution.
8. Nothing in this Instrument affects the
continuance of my Sovereignty in and over
this State, or, save as provided by or under
this Instrument, the exercise of any powers,
authority and rights now enjoyed by me as
Ruler of this State or the validity of any law
at present in force in this State.
9. I hereby declare that I execute this
Instrument on behalf of this State and that
any reference in this Instrument to me or to
the Ruler of the State is to be construed as
including a reference to my heirs and
successors.
Given under my hand this 26th day of October,
nineteen hundred and forty seven.
Sd/-
Hari Singh
Maharaja Dhiraj of Jammu and
Kashmir State.
(Acceptance of Instrument of Accession)
I do hereby accept this Instrument of Accession.
Dated this twenty seventh day of October,
Nineteen hundred and forty seven.
Sd/-
Mountabatten of Burma
Governor General of India
27th October 1947
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The main features of this agreement were:
(i) in view of the uniform and consistent stand
taken up by the Jammu and Kashmir
Constituent Assembly that sovereignty in all
matters other than those specified in the
Instrument of Accession continues to reside
in the State, the Government of India agreed
that, while the residuary powers of legislature
vested in the Centre in respect of all states
other than Jammu and Kashmir, in the case
of the latter they vested in the State itself;
(ii) it was agreed between the two Governments
that in accordance with Article 5 of the
Indian Constitution, persons who have their
domicile in Jammu and Kashmir shall be
regarded as citizens of India, but the State
legislature was given power to make laws
for conferring special rights and privileges
on the ‘state subjects’ in view of the ‘State
Subject Notifications of 1927 and 1932: the
State legislature was also empowered to
make laws for the ‘State Subjects’ who had
gone to Pakistan on account of the
communal disturbances of 1947, in the
event of their return to Kashmir;
(iii) as the President of India commands the
same respect in the State as he does in other
Units of India, Articles 52 to 62 of the
Constitution relating to him should be
applicable to the State. It was further agreed
that the power to grant reprieves, pardons
and remission of sentences etc; would also
vest in the President of India;
(iv) the Union Government agreed that the State
should have its own flag in addition to the
Union flag, but it was agreed by the State
Government that the State flag would not
be a rival of the Union flag; it was also
recognised that the Union flag should have
the same status and position in Jammu and
Kashmir as in the rest of India, but for
historical reasons connected with the
freedom struggle in the State, the need for
continuance of the State flag was recognised;
(v) there was complete agreement with regard to
the position of the Sadar-i-Riyasat; though the
Sadar-i-Riyasat was to be elected by the State
Legislature, he had to be recognised by the
President of India before his installation as
such; in other Indian States the Head of the
State was appointed by the President and was
as such his nominee but the person to be
appointed as the Head, had to be a person
acceptable to the Government of that State;
no person who is not acceptable to the State
Government can be thrust on the State as the
Head. The difference in the case of Kashmir
lies only in the fact that Sadar-i-Riyasat will
in the first place be elected by the State
legislature itself instead of being a nominee of
the Government and the President of India.
With regard to the powers and functions of
the Sadar-i-Riyasat the following argument
was mutually agreed upon:
“a. the Head of the State shall be a person
recognised by the President of the
Union on the recommendations of the
Legislature of the State;
b. he shall hold office during the pleasure
of the President;
The Delhi Agreement, 1952
(Courtesy: Department of Law, Justice & Parliamentary Affairs,
Government of Jammu and Kashmir)
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c. he may, by writing under his hand
addressed to the President, resign his
office;
d. subject to the foregoing provisions, the
Head of the State shall hold office for a
term of five years from the date he
enters upon his office;
e. provided that he shall, notwithstanding
the expiration of his term, continue to
hold the office until his successor enters
upon his office.”
(vi) with regard to the fundamental rights,
some basic principles agreed between the
parties were enunciated; it was accepted
that the people of the State were to have
fundamental rights. But in the view of the
peculiar position in which the State was
placed, the whole chapter relating to
‘Fundamental Rights’ of the Indian
Constitution could not be made applicable
to the State, the question which remained
to be determined was whether the chapter
on fundamental rights should form a
part of the State Constitution of the
Constitution of India as applicable to the
State;
(vii) with regard to the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court of India, it was accepted
that for the time being, owing to the
existence of the Board of Judicial Advisers
in the State, which was the highest judicial
authority in the State, the Supreme Court
should have only appellate jurisdiction;
(viii) there was a great deal of discussion with
regard to the “Emergency Powers”; the
Government of India insisted on the
application of Article 352, empowering the
President to proclaim a general emergency
in the State; the State Government argued
that in the exercise of its powers over
defence (Item 1 on the Union List), in the
event of war or external aggression, the
Government of India would have full
authority to take steps and proclaim
emergency but the State delegation was,
however, averse to the President exercising
the power to proclaim a general emergency
on account of internal disturbance.
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Highlights of the “agreed conclusions”:
Jammu and Kashmir, which is a constituent
unit of the Union of India, shall in its relations
with the Union continue to be governed by
Article 370 of the Indian Constitution.
The residuary powers of legislation shall
remain with the State; however, Parliament will
continue to have power to make laws relating to
the prevention of activities against the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of India.
Any provision of the Indian Constitution
which had been applied to the State with
modifications will be altered or repealed by
presidential order; but provisions already applied
without modification are unalterable.
The State will be free to have its own
legislation on matters like welfare measures
cultural matters, personal law and procedural
laws. The State government can review the laws
made by Parliament or extended to the State
after 1953 on any matter relatable to the
concurrent list and may be decided which of
them needs amendment or repeal. In future the
State Government shall be consulted regarding
the application of any such law to the State.
Any law made by the State Legislature
seeking to change any provision of the State
Constitution relating to: a) the appointment,
powers and immunities of the Governor, and b)
the control of elections by the Indian Election
Commission, eligibility for inclusion in the
electoral rolls without discrimination, adult
suffrage and composition of the Legislative
Council will need the President’s assent.
No agreement was possible on the question
of nomenclature of the Governor and the Chief
Minister. (Sheikh Abdullah wanted the titles to
be Sadar-e-Riyasat (Head of State) and Wazir-e-
Azam (Prime Minister).
6-point Indira-Shiekh pact of 1975
(Courtesy: Department of Law, Justice & Parliamentary Affairs,
Government of Jammu and Kashmir)
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